Abstract This paper models the decision of vertically linked firms to build either partitioned or connected networks of supply of an intermediate good. In each case, there is a correlation between the locations of upstream and downstream firms. Input specificity is related to both variable costs (transport costs of the input) and fixed costs (learning costs of the use of the input). When both are low, a connected network emerges, whereas, in the opposite case, we find a partitioned pattern. In the boundary region, there are multiple equilibria, either asymmetric (mixed network) or symmetric.
Introduction
The issue of the flexibility of an intermediate good concerns the choice that a supplier makes between either producing a specialized input exactly tailored to the needs of a given buyer or manufacturing a generic or standardized input that can be used by all or at least by several buyers. In spatial terms, if we define the sellers and buyers of the intermediate good by addresses in an attribute space, the specialization strategy amounts to the input supplier competing locally in its neighborhood, while the generic strategy is equivalent to competing globally in the whole attribute space.
This issue is important for two reasons. The first is the relationship between input specificity and the incentive to vertical integration, established by Williamson (1981) and Joskow (1987) . Under input specificity, there is an incentive for the creation of a long-term bilateral relationship between buyer and seller, which is best governed J. P. Pontes (B) ISEG/Technical University of Lisbon and UECE, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1249-078 Lisboa, Portugal e-mail: ppontes@iseg.utl.pt (in the sense of minimizing transaction costs) in the context of vertical integration rather than through the open market. Although this is an important strand in the literature, we will stress that the importance of input specificity lies elsewhere.
According to Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2001) , the decision to specialize an input conditions the structure of the network of relations between upstream and downstream firms. In particular, the degree of connectivity of a network depends on the decisions taken with regard to specialization. If most supplying firms decide to specialize their inputs, a "partitioned" network will emerge, in the sense that it consists of sparse, exclusive relations. In such a network, each node (firm) has at most one connection. In contrast, if the upstream firms decide to produce generic inputs, each supplier will sell to several buyers and each buyer will procure the input from several sellers, so that a connected network will emerge, in which each node (firm) has at least two connections. The structure of the network matters because a partitioned structure implies a closer interdependence between the industrial dynamics at the upstream and downstream levels closer than in the connected structure. This is the case of the aircraft industry, where turboprop technology leads to vertical relations that are much closer than those prevailing under jet technology.
We usually regard the choice of the degree of specialization of an input as the outcome of a trade-off between economies of scale (maximized under the standardization of the input) and adjustment costs (minimized if the inputs are specialized, see Lorz and Wrede 2005) . A generic input can be produced in large amounts, thus saving fixed costs, but on the other hand it must be adapted to the specific needs of the users. We can view these adaptation costs as transport costs relating to the distance between the seller and buyer's addresses in the attribute space.
This paper seeks to model the adjustment costs of the intermediate good, using the spatial framework. We assume that the transport cost of the intermediate good in the distance between the seller and the buyer's addresses is the variable component of the adjustment cost, as mentioned by the literature on flexible manufacturing systems (see Eaton and Schmitt 1994, Norman and Thisse 1999) and on the endogenous choice of the degree of input specificity (see Pontes 2005) . Furthermore, Kranton and Minehart (2000) argue that input flexibility has not only a variable cost, but also a fixed cost. In order to sell the input, the upstream firm has to train the buyer to use it, and this learning cost has the nature of a fixed cost.
We present the model in Sect. 2 and draw our conclusions in Sect. 3.
The model

Assumptions
The paper models a spatial economy that obeys the following assumptions:
1. Consumers are uniformly distributed with unit density in the space described by the interval [0, 1] . Each consumer has an elastic inverse demand function, specified as p = 1 − q. 2. Two downstream firms, D a and D b , supply a consumer good in the market space.
These firms have fixed locations at the end points of the market: D a locates in 0
